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Abstract
We study incentive compatible mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions where the bidders
have submodular (or XOS) valuations and are budget-constrained. Our objective is to maximize
the liquid welfare, a notion of efficiency for budget-constrained bidders introduced by Dobzinski
and Paes Leme (2014). We show that some of the known truthful mechanisms that best-
approximate the social welfare for Combinatorial Auctions with submodular bidders through
demand query oracles can be adapted, so that they retain truthfulness and achieve asymp-
totically the same approximation guarantees for the liquid welfare. More specifically, for the
problem of optimizing the liquid welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with submodular bidders,
we obtain a universally truthful randomized O(logm)-approximate mechanism, where m is the
number of items, by adapting the mechanism of Krysta and Vo¨cking (2012).
Additionally, motivated by large market assumptions often used in mechanism design, we
introduce a notion of competitive markets and show that in such markets, liquid welfare can be
approximated within a constant factor by a randomized universally truthful mechanism. Finally,
in the Bayesian setting, we obtain a truthful O(1)-approximate mechanism for the case where
bidder valuations are generated as independent samples from a known distribution, by adapting
the results of Feldman, Gravin and Lucier (2014).
1 Introduction
Imagine that you are a social planner wanting to auction-off the seats of a local stadium at an
extremely wealthy neighborhood (i.e., people have no budget constraints for the seats) for a big
concert. As a social planner, your goal is to allocate the seats in a way that maximizes (or, at least,
approximates as closely as possible) the happiness of the people interested in these seats. However,
different people have different seat preferences; some people are happy with two consecutive seats
anywhere in the stadium, and some might want a whole row. Phrased in mechanism design lan-
guage, this is a Combinatorial Auction, where you seek to optimize the social welfare by a truthful
mechanism. Combinatorial Auctions, like the one above, appear in many AI-centric contexts (e.g.,
spectrum auctions, network routing auctions [22], airport time-slot auctions [27], etc.) and have
been a central topic in the study of Multi-Agent Systems. They have also experienced a recent in-
terest in the AI community with works employing ML algorithms to overcome standard complexity
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problems (e.g., [5, 6]).
As if this problem was not hard enough to solve, imagine that you find out two unfortunate
events; the stadium is in fact at a working-middle class neighborhood (i.e., people do have budget
constraints) and your boss is concerned about the effect of these budget constraints on the potential
revenue. Now, the objective function should balance between the willingness and the ability of the
people to pay for their seats. Motivated by usual discrepancies between the auction participants’
ability and willingness to pay, Dobzinski and Paes Leme [8] introduced the notion of liquid welfare,
which is the minimum of an agent’s budget and valuation for a bundle of goods. As such, maximizing
the liquid welfare achieves a reasonable compromise between social efficiency and potential for
revenue extraction (which is constrained by the budgets).
Problem Definition. More formally, a Combinatorial Auction (CA) consists of a set U of m items
to be allocated to n bidders. Each bidder i has a valuation function vi : 2
U → R≥0. Valuation
functions, v, are assumed to be non-decreasing, i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T ), for all S ⊆ T ⊆ U , and normalized
v(∅) = 0. For the objective of social welfare (SW), the goal is to compute a partitioning S =
(S1, . . . , Sn) of the set of items, U , that maximizes v(S) =
∑n
i=1 vi(Si). For the objective of
liquid welfare (LW), we assume that each bidder i also has a budget Bi ∈ R≥0 and the liquid
welfare that can be extracted from agent i for each set of items S ⊆ U is v¯i(S) = min{vi(S), Bi}1.
Under this objective, the goal is to compute a partitioning S = (S1, . . . , Sn) of U that maximizes
v¯(S) =∑ni=1 v¯i(Si).
We focus on CAs with submodular or XOS bidders. A set function v : 2U → R≥0 is submodular if
for every S, T ⊆ U , v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ) and subadditive if v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ).
A set function v is XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive, see [19]) if there exist additive functions
wk : 2
U → R≥0 such that for every S ⊆ U , v(S) = maxk{wk(S)}. The class of submodular
functions is a proper subset of the class of XOS functions, which in turn is a proper subset of the
class of subadditive functions.
Since bidder valuations have exponential size, a polynomial (in m and n) algorithm must have
oracle access to them. A value query specifies a set S ⊆ U and receives the value v(S). A demand
query, denoted by DQ(v, U, ~p), specifies a valuation function v, a set U of available items and a price
pj for each available item j ∈ U , and receives the set (or bundle) S ⊆ U maximizing v(S)−
∑
j∈S pj ,
i.e., the set of available items that maximizes bidder’s utility at these prices. For brevity, we often
write p(S) =
∑
j∈S pj to denote the price of a bundle S. Demand queries are strictly more powerful
than value queries. Value queries can be simulated by polynomially many demand queries, and
in terms of communication cost, demand queries are exponentially stronger than value queries [3].
Our mechanisms are polynomial-time, given access to demand oracles, which in general can be
NP-hard to compute.
1.1 Previous Work on Social Welfare
Truthful maximization of SW in CAs with submodular or XOS bidders has been a central problem
in Algorithmic Mechanism Design, with many powerful results. Due to space restrictions, we
only discuss results most relevant to our work. While discussing previous work below, we assume
XOS bidders and polynomial-time randomized truthful mechanisms that approximate the SW, by
accessing valuations through demand queries, unless mentioned otherwise.
1Slightly abusing the terminology, we refer to v¯i(S) as agent i’s liquid valuation.
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In the worst-case setting, where we do not make any further assumptions on bidder valuations,
Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira [10] presented the first truthful mechanism with a non-trivial ap-
proximation guarantee of O(log2m). Dobzinski [12] improved the approximation ratio toO(logm log logm)
for the more general class of subadditive valuations. Subsequently, Krysta and Vo¨cking [23] pro-
vided an elegant randomized online mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio of O(logm)
for XOS valuations. Dobzinski [14] broke the logarithmic barrier for XOS valuations, by providing
an approximation guarantee of O(
√
logm). We highlight that accessing valuations through demand
queries is essential for these strong positive results. Dobzinski [13] proved that any truthful mecha-
nism for submodular CAs with approximation ratio better than m
1
2
−ε must use exponentially many
value queries.
In the Bayesian setting, bidder valuations are drawn as independent samples from a known distri-
bution. Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier [20] showed how to obtain item prices that provide a constant
approximation ratio for XOS valuations. These results were significantly extended and strength-
ened in the recent work of Du¨etting et al. [15], and a (truly) polynomial algorithm was provided as
well.
1.2 Intuition, Main Ideas, and Contribution
Our aim is to extend these results to the objective of LW. To this end, we exploit the fact that most
of the mechanisms above follow a simple pattern: first, by exploring either part of the instance in
[23] or the knowledge about the valuation distribution in [20], the mechanism computes appropriate
(a.k.a. supporting) prices for all items. Then, these prices are “posted” to the bidders, who arrive
one-by-one and select their utility-maximizing bundle, through a demand query, from the set of
available items (see Algorithm 1).
The technical intuition behind the high level approach above is nicely explained in [14, Section 1.2].
Let O = (O1, . . . , On) be an optimal solution for the SW (in fact, any constant factor approximation
suffices). The supporting price of item i in O is qj = wk({j}), where wk is the additive valuation
determining the value vi(Oi) (recall that valuation functions are XOS). Intuitively, qj is how much
item j contributes to the social welfare ofO. Then, a price of pj = qj/2 for each item j is appropriate
in the sense that a constant approximation to v(O) can be obtained by letting the bidders arrive
one-by-one, in an arbitrary order, and allocating to each bidder i her utility maximizing bundle,
chosen from the set of available items by a demand query (see [14, Lemma 4.2]).
Hence, approximating the SW by demand queries boils down to computing such prices pj . In the
Bayesian setting, prices pj can be obtained by drawing n samples from the valuation distribution
and computing the expected contribution of each item j to a constant factor approximation of
the optimal allocation (see Section 3 and Lemma 3.4 in [20]). Similarly, the idea of estimating
the contribution of the items would work under some market uniformity assumption, as the one
introduced in Definition 5.1. In the worst-case setting, if we assume integral and polynomially-
bounded valuations (i.e., that maxi{vi(U)} ≤ md, for some constant d), a uniform price for all
items selected at random from 1, 2, 4, 8, . . . , 2d logm results in an logarithmic approximation ratio.
Krysta and Vo¨cking [23] show how to estimate supporting prices online, by combining binary search
and randomized rounding. Importantly, as long as each bidder does not affect the prices offered to
her, this general approach results in (randomized, universally) truthful mechanisms.
Towards extending the above approach and results to the LW, our first observation (Lemma 3.1)
is that if a valuation function v is submodular (resp. XOS), then the corresponding liquid val-
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uation function v¯ = min{v,B} is also submodular (resp. XOS). Then, one can directly use the
mechanisms of e.g., [23, 14, 20] with valuation functions v¯ = min{v,B} and demand queries of
the form: DQ(min{v,B}, U, ~p) (i.e., wrt. the liquid valuation of the bidders) and obtain the same
approximation guarantees but now for the LW. However, the resulting mechanisms are no longer
truthful; bidders still seek to maximize their utility (i.e., value minus price) from the bundle that
they get, subject to their budget constraint, rather than their liquid utility (i.e., liquid value minus
price). Specifically, given a set of items U available at prices pj, j ∈ U , a budget-constrained bidder
i wants to receive the bundle Si = argmaxS⊆U{vi(S)− p(S) | p(S) ≤ Bi}, and might not be happy
with the bundle S′i = argmaxS⊆U{v¯i(S) − p(S)} computed by the demand query for the liquid
valuation2.
To restore truthfulness, we replace demand queries with budget-constrained demand queries. A
budget-constrained demand query, denoted by BCDQ(v, U, ~p,B), specifies a valuation function v,
a set of available items U , a price pj for each j ∈ U and a budget B, and receives the set S ⊆ U
maximizing v(S)−p(S), subject to p(S) ≤ B, i.e., the set of available items that maximizes bidder’s
utility subject to her budget constraint.
To establish the approximation ratio, we first observe that the fact that liquid valuations are XOS
suffices for estimating supporting prices, as in previous work on the SW. Additionally, we show
that the bundles allocated by BCDQ(v, U, ~p,B) approximately satisfy the efficiency guarantees on
the liquid welfare and the liquid utility of the allocated bundles (see Lemma 3.3). Specifically, we
observe that the approximation guarantees of mechanisms for the SW mostly follow from the fact
that a demand query DQ(v, U, ~p) guarantees that for the allocated bundle S and for any T ⊆ U ,
(i) v(S)− p(S) ≥ v(T )− p(T ), and (ii) v(S) ≥ v(T )− p(T ). In Lemma 3.3, we show that a budget-
constrained demand query, BCDQ(v, U, ~p,B), guarantees that for the allocated bundle S and any
T ⊆ U , (i) 2v¯(S)− p(S) ≥ v¯(T ) − p(T ), and (ii) v¯(S) ≥ v¯(T )− p(T ). Using this property, we can
prove the equivalent of [14, Lemma 4.2]and also the approximation guarantees of the mechanisms
in Krysta and Vo¨cking [23], Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier [20] but for the LW.
Contribution. Formalizing the intuition above, we obtain (i) a randomized universally truthful
mechanism that approximates the LW within a factor of O(logm) (Section 4), and (ii) a posted-price
mechanism that approximates the LW within a constant factor when bidder valuations are drawn
as independent samples from a known distribution (Section 6). Both mechanisms assume XOS
bidder valuations; the former is based on the mechanism of Krysta and Vo¨cking [23] and the latter
on the mechanism of Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier [20].
Motivated by large market assumptions often used in Algorithmic Mechanism Design (see e.g.,
[4, 18, 26] and the references therein), we introduce a competitive market assumption in Section 5.
Competitive Markets are closer to practice, since they stand in between the stochastic and the worst-
case settings, in terms of the assumptions made. The main idea is that when there is an abundance
of bidders, even if we remove a random half of them, the optimal LW does not decrease by much.
Then, computing supporting prices for all items based on a randomly chosen half of the bidders,
and offering these prices through budget-constrained demand queries to the other half, yields a
universally truthful mechanism that approximates LW within a constant factor (Theorem 5.5).
2For a concrete example, consider a bidder with budget B = 2 and two items a and b available at prices pa = 2 and
pb = 1. Assume that the bidder’s valuation function is v({a}) = v({a, b}) = 10, v({b}) = 2 (and therefore, her liquid
valuation is v¯({a}) = v¯({b}) = v¯({a, b}) = 2). The bidder wants to get item a at price 2, which gives her utility
8. However, the demand query for her liquid valuation function v¯ allocates item b, which gives her a utility of 1.
Clearly, in this example, the bidder would have incentive to misreport her preferences to the demand query oracle.
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Conceptually, in this work, we present a general approach through which known truthful approx-
imations to the SW, that access valuations through demand queries, can be adapted so that they
retain truthfulness and achieve similar approximation guarantees for the LW. The important prop-
erties required are that liquid valuation functions v¯ belong to the same class as valuation functions
v (proven for submodular, XOS and subadditive valuations), and that the efficiency guarantees
of budget-constrained demand queries on liquid welfare and liquid utility are similar to the cor-
responding efficiency guarantees of standard demand queries for liquid valuations (proven for all
classes of valuations functions). Indeed, applying this approach to the mechanism of Dobzinski
[14], we obtain a universally truthful mechanism that approximates the LW for CAs with XOS
bidders within a factor of O(
√
logm) (the details are omitted due to space constraints). Similarly,
we can take advantage of the improved results of Du¨etting et al. [15] in the Bayesian setting. All
the missing proofs can be found in the full version of the paper on [21].
1.3 Previous Work on Liquid Welfare
Liquid welfare was introduced as an efficiency measure for auctions when bidders are budget con-
strained in [8] (since it was known that getting any non-trivial approximation for the SW in these
cases is impossible) and it corresponds to the optimal revenue an omniscient seller could extract
from the set of the bidders, had he known their valuations and their budgets. Moreover, Dobzinski
and Paes Leme [8] proved a O(log n) (resp. (log2 n))-approximation to the optimal LW for the case
of a single divisible item and submodular (resp. subadditive) bidders. Dobzinski and Paes Leme [8]
and Lu and Xiao [25] proved that the optimal LW can be approximated truthfully within constant
factor for a single divisible good, additive bidder valuations and public budgets. Closer to our
setting, Lu and Xiao [26] provided a truthful mechanism that achieves a constant factor approxi-
mation to the LW for multi-item auctions with divisible items, under a large market assumption.
Under similar large market assumptions, Eden, Feldman, and Vardi [18] obtained mechanisms that
approximate the optimal revenue within a constant factor for multi-unit online auctions with divis-
ible and indivisible items, and a mechanism that achieves a constant approximation to the optimal
LW for general valuations over divisible items. However, prior to our work, there was no work on
approximating the LW in CAs (in fact, that was one of the open problems in [8]).
Our work is remotely related to the literature of budget feasible mechanism design, a topic intro-
duced by Singer [28] and studied in e.g., [11, 7, 2, 1, 29]. Budget feasible mechanism design focuses
on payment optimization in reverse auctions, a setting almost orthogonal to the setting we consider
in this work.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
The problem and most of the terminology and the notation are introduced in Section 1. In this
section, we introduce some additional notation required for the technical part.
We use E[X] to denote the expectation of a random variable X and P[E] to denote the probability
of an event E. Let OPT (resp. OPT) denote the optimal SW (resp. LW)3. For some ρ > 1, which
may depend on n and m, we say that a mechanism is ρ-approximate for the optimal SW (resp.
LW) if it produces an allocation S with ρ · v(S) ≥ OPT (resp. ρ · v¯(S) ≥ OPT).
3The instance is clear from the context.
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Algorithm 1 Core Mechanism
1: Fix an ordering π of bidders and set U1 = U .
2: Set initial prices for the items: ~p(1) = (p
(1)
1 , . . . , p
(1)
m ).
3: for each bidder i = 1, . . . , n according to π do
4: Let Si = DQ(vi, Ui, ~p
(i), )
5: With probability q, allocate Si to i and set Ui+1 = Ui \ Si . Otherwise, set Ui+1 = Ui .
6: Update item prices to ~p(i+1) = (p
(i+1)
1 , . . . , p
(i+1)
m ).
7: end for
Let a social choice function f : V¯ n → A, which maps the set of liquid valuation functions of the
bidders, V¯ : V ×B, to an allocation, A, and a payment scheme q = (q1, . . . , qn) for this allocation.
A deterministic mechanism is defined by the pair (f, q). Our mechanisms in this work are going
to be randomized, i.e., they are probability distributions over deterministic mechanisms. The
incentives desiderata for randomized mechanisms are usually either universal truthfulness (when
for all the deterministic mechanisms, the bidders’ dominant strategy is truthfulness) or truthfulness
in expectation [9, 16] (when bidders’ expected utilities are maximized under truthful reporting of
their private information). In this work, we are focusing on the former, stronger notion; the one of
universal truthfulness, under the bidders’ budget constraints.
Definition 2.1 (Universal Truthfulness under Budget Constraints). Let (f˜ , q˜) be a randomized
mechanism over a set of deterministic mechanisms {(f1, q1), . . . , (fk, qk)}. Mechanism (f˜ , q˜) is
universally truthful if for all i ∈ [n], κ ∈ [k] and for any v′i and any B′i, such that qκ(v′i, v−i) ≤ B′i
and qκ(vi, v−i) ≤ Bi, it holds that:
vi(f
κ(vi, Bi, v−i, B−i))− qκ(vi, Bi, v−i, B−i) ≥ vi(fκ(v′i, B′i, v−i, B−i))− qκ(v′i, B′i, v−i, B−i)
3 Approach
First, we show that if the bidder valuations are submodular (resp. XOS, subadditive), then their
liquid valuations are submodular (resp. XOS, subadditive) as well.
Lemma 3.1. Let v be a non-negative monotone submodular (resp. XOS, subadditive) function.
Then, for any B ∈ R≥0, v¯ = min{v,B} is also monotone submodular (resp. XOS, subadditive).
In Algorithm 1, we present a universally truthful (since the prices offered to each bidder do not
depend on her declaration and demand queries maximize bidders’ utility) mechanism, which is a
simplified version of the mechanism in [23] for approximating SW in CAs. Since for the LW, bidders
have budgets, we replace the demand queries DQ(vi, Ui, ~p
(i)) in line 4 with budget constrained
demand queries BCDQ(vi, Ui, ~p
(i), Bi)
4. As explained in Section 1.2, Algorithm 1 with BCDQs
remains universally truthful for budget-constrained bidders.
Lemma 3.2 (Truthfulness of BCDQs). For budget-constrained bidders, Algorithm 1 with BCDQs
in line 4, is universally truthful.
4In all our mechanisms, if budgets are larger than the valuations of the allocated bundles, the mechanism with BCDQ
behaves identically to the mechanism with DQ (i.e., revenue and SW are not affected by the change in the objective.)
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The lemma follows directly from Definition 2.1. Nevertheless, universal truthfulness is not our
sole desideratum; in each of the three settings analyzed in the following sections, we show why
mechanisms similar in spirit to Algorithm 1 with BCDQs, yield good approximation guarantees for
the LW. Before the setting-specific analyses, we relate the efficiency of BCDQ to the efficiency of
standard DQs for liquid valutions.
Lemma 3.3. Let S ⊆ U be the set allocated by the BCDQ for a bidder with valuation v and
budget B. Then, for every other T ⊆ U , the following hold:
i) v¯(S) ≥ v¯(T )− p(T )
ii) 2v¯(S)− p(S) ≥ v¯(T )− p(T ).
Proof. We will prove each claim of the lemma separately. For claim i), notice that if p(T ) > B,
then the right hand side of the inequality will be negative and thus, the inequality trivially holds.
So, we will focus on the case where p(T ) ≤ B. We distinguish the following cases:
1. (v¯(S) = v(S) and v¯(T ) = v(T )) Hence, B ≥ v(T ). Bundle T was considered at the time of
the query and yet, the query returned set S. Thus: v¯(S) ≥ v¯(S) − p(S) = v(S) − p(S) ≥
v(T )− p(T ) = v¯(T )− p(T ).
2. (v¯(S) = B and v¯(T ) = B) Then, the inequality trivially holds since: B ≥ B−p(T ) and prices
are non-negative.
3. (v¯(S) = B and v¯(T ) = v(T )) The inequality holds since: B ≥ B − p(T ) ≥ v(T ) − p(T ) =
v¯(T )− p(T ).
4. (v¯(S) = v(S) and v¯(T ) = B) Hence, B ≤ v(T ). Bundle T was considered at the time of
the query and yet, the query returned set S. Thus, v¯(S) ≥ v¯(S) − p(S) = v(S) − p(S) ≥
v(T )− p(T ) ≥ B − p(T ) = v¯(T )− p(T ).
This concludes our proof for claim i).
For claim ii), notice that since S is the set received from the BCDQ, then it is affordable: v¯(S) ≥
p(S). Adding this inequality to the inequality of claim i), we have that: 2v¯(S) − p(S) ≥ v¯(T ) −
p(T ). N
4 Worst-Case Setting
For the worst-case instances, adapting appropriately our Core Mechanism, we present Algorithm 2
(based again, on the mechanism of [23]). The only difference is that budget-constrained bidders in
Algorithm 2 are restricted to using BCDQs, instead of DQs, thus making the mechanism universally
truthful (see Section 3). Resembling the analysis of [23], we show that for 1/q = Θ(logm), Algo-
rithm 2 achieves an approximation ratio of O(logm) for the LW. First, we note that parameter5 L
is selected so that there exists only one bidder whose liquid valuation for U (weakly) exceeds it.
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 2 is universally truthful and for q = 1/Θ(logm), achieves an approxi-
mation ratio of O(logm) for the LW.
5L can be computed with standard techniques, as explained in [23].
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Algorithm 2 KV-Mechanism for Liquid Welfare
1: Fix an ordering π of bidders and set U1 = U .
2: Set initial prices p
(1)
1 = · · · = p(1)m = L4m .
3: for each bidder i = 1, . . . , n according to π do
4: Let Si = BCDQ(vi, Ui, ~p
(i), Bi)
5: With probability q, allocate Ri = Si to i and set Ui+1 = Ui \ Si . Otherwise, set Ui+1 =
Ui, Ri = ∅ .
6: Update prices ∀j ∈ Si: p(i+1)j = 2p(i)j .
7: end for
We present a series of Lemmas that will lead us naturally to the proof of the Theorem. Let
S = (S1, . . . , Sn) and R = (R1, . . . , Rn) the provisional and the final allocation of Algorithm 2
respectively. First, we provide two useful bounds on v¯(S). We find it important to also discuss an
overselling variant of Algorithm 2. In the Overselling variant, allow us to assume that for Step 5
of Algorithm 2, q = 1 (i.e., Si is allocated to bidder i with certainty) and Ui+1 = Ui = U (thus
the name of the variant). The Overselling variant allocates at most k = log(4m) + 2 copies of each
item and collects a liquid welfare within a constant factor of the optimal LW. To see that, observe
that for q = 1, after allocating k − 1 copies of some item j, j’s price becomes L4m2log(4m)+1 = 2L.
Then, there is only one agent with liquid valuation larger than L who can get a copy of j.
Lemma 4.2. Let pj denote the final price of each item j. Then, for any sets U1, . . . , Un ⊆ U of
items available when the bidders arrive, Algorithm 2 with q = 1 satisfies v¯(S) ≥∑j∈U pj − L4 .
Proof. Since bidders are individually rational and do not violate their budget constraints, for every
bidder i it holds that Bi ≥
∑
j∈Si
p
(i)
j and vi(Si) ≥
∑
j∈Si
p
(i)
j . The rest of the proof is identical
to the proof of [23, Lemma 2] for b = 1. Specifically, let ℓ
(i)
j be the number of copies of item j
allocated just before bidder i arrives, and let ℓj be the total number of copies of item j allocated
by Algorithm 2 with q = 1. Then, using the fact that pj = L · 2
ℓj
4m :
v¯(S) ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si
p
(i)
j =
L
4m
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si
2ℓ
(i)
j =
L
4m
∑
j∈U
(2ℓj − 1) =
∑
j∈U
pj − L
4
N
Lemma 4.3. For sets U1 = · · · = Un ⊆ U , the Overselling variant of Algorithm 2 with q = 1
satisfies v¯(S) ≥ OPT−∑j∈U pj.
Proof. Let O = (O1, . . . , On) be the optimal allocation. From Lemma 3.3, we get that for each
bidder i, v¯(Si) ≥ v¯(Oi)−
∑
j∈Oi
p
(i)
j ≥ v¯(Oi)−
∑
j∈Oi
pj , where we use that the final price of each
item is the largest one. Summing over all bidders, we have that v¯(S) ≥ v¯(O) −∑ni=1
∑
j∈Oi
pj ≥
OPT −∑j∈U pj, where the last inequality uses the fact that the optimal solution is feasible and
thus, each item is allocated at most once in O. N
Lemma 4.4. The Overselling variant of Algorithm 2 with q = 1 allocates at most log(4m) + 2
copies of each item and computes an allocation S with liquid welfare v¯(S) ≥ 38OPT.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 4.2, Lemma 4.3 and the fact that OPT ≥ L. N
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Of course, the allocation S in Lemma 4.4 is infeasible, since it allocates a logarithmic number of
copies of each item. The remedy is to use an allocation probability q = 1/Θ(logm). For such values
of q, we can plug in the proof of [23, Lemma 6] (which just uses that the valuation functions are
fractionally subadditive) and show that for each agent i and for all A ⊆ U , E[v¯i(A∩Ui)] ≥ v¯i(A)/2.
We are now ready to conclude the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.5. For Algorithm 2 with q−1 = 4(log(4m) + 1), it holds that E[v¯(S)] ≥ OPT/8 and
E[v¯(R)] ≥ qOPT/8.
Proof. Let O = (O1, . . . , On) be the optimal allocation. For each bidder i, Lemma 3.3 implies that
the response Si of BCDQ satisfies v¯i(Si) ≥ v¯i(Oi ∩ Ui) −
∑
j∈Oi∩Ui
p
(i)
j , for any Ui resulted from
the outcome of the random coin flips. Therefore, E[v¯i(Si)] ≥ E[v¯i(Oi ∩ Ui)]− E[
∑
j∈Oi∩Ui
p
(i)
j ]. By
the choice of q, for any bidder i, E[v¯i(Oi ∩ Ui)] ≥ v¯i(Oi)/2. Then, working with the expectations
as in the proofs of Lemma 4.2, Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4, we can show that E[v¯(S)] ≥ OPT/8.
Finally, one can use linearity of expectation and show that E[v¯(R)] = q E[v¯(S)]. The details are
omitted, due to lack of space, and can be found in [23, Lemma 4]. N
5 Competitive Market
Borgs et al. [4] were the first ones to define a budget dominance parameter that corresponded to the
ratio of the maximum budget of all the bidders to the value of the optimum SW in the context of
multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders. More recently, Eden, Feldman, and Vardi [18]
and Lu and Xiao [26] used similar notions of budget dominance6 (termed large market assumptions)
as a means to achieve constant factor approximation to the LW in multi-unit auctions and auctions
with divisible items respectively. However, for the case of indivisible items, it is clear that the
definition of a large market used in the previous cases, becomes almost void (see Appendix C for a
discussion). Below, we first introduce our definition of Competitive Markets for indivisible goods
and then, show how one can obtain a constant factor approximation of the optimal LW, when
bidders have XOS liquid valuations.
Definition 5.1 ((ε, δ) - Competitive Market). Let 0 ≤ ε < 2 and a constant 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/2. A
market is called (ε, δ) - Competitive Market, if for any randomly removed set of bidders, S, with
cardinality n/2, then for the remaining set of bidders, T, it holds that:
P
[
OPTT ≥
(
1− ε
2
)
·OPT
]
≥ 1− δ (1)
where by OPTT we denote the optimal LW achieved by bidders in set T.
Proposition 5.2. In an (ε, δ) - Competitive Market, let S ⊆ [n] be randomly chosen s.t. |S|= n2
and let T = [n] \ S. Then:
P
[{
OPTT ≥
(
1− ε2
)
OPT
} ∩ {OPTS ≥
(
1− ε2
)
OPT
}]
≥ 1− 2δ
Proof. Let XS the event that OPTS ≥
(
1− ε2
)
OPT and XT the event that OPTT ≥
(
1− ε2
)
OPT.
Then, we have:
P [XS ∩XT] = 1− P
[
XS ∪XT
] ≥ 1− 2δ
6Namely, ∀i ∈ [n] : Bi ≤ OPT/(mc), with c a large constant.
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where the inequality follows from the Union Bound. N
We are now ready to state our Competitive Market mechanism that will be used for approximating
the optimal LW. We note here that the greedy algorithm A is due to Lehmann, Lehmann, and
Nisan [24].
Algorithm 3 Competitive Market (CM) Algorithm
1: Divide the bidders into sets S,T uniformly at random, s.t., |S|= n2 = |T|.
2: Run the greedy algorithm A for bidders in S and denote the solution obtained by AS.
3: for j ∈ U do
4: Set pj =
1
2β v¯
(
ASj
)
, where β > 1 is a constant
5: end for
6: Fix an internal ordering of bidders in T, π, and set U1 = U .
7: for each bidder i ∈ T arriving according to π do
8: Let Si = BCDQ(vi, Ui, ~p).
9: Set Ui+1 = Ui \ Si.
10: end for
As usual, we denote S = (S1, . . . , Sn) the final allocation from mechanism presented in Algorithm 3.
Valuations of bidders are XOS (and so are the liquid valuations (Lemma 3.1)); let ai be the
maximizing clause of Si in the liquid valuation v¯i of bidder i. Since ai’s are additive, for each
bidder i and j ∈ Si let qj = ai({j}). Notice that
∑
i∈[n] v¯(Si) =
∑
j∈∪i∈[n]Si
qj. We denote by
OPTT =
∑
j∈U q
T
j , where q
T
j is the contribution of item j in OPTT. We divide the set of all items
U into two sets; the set of competitive items, denoted by C and the set of non-competitive items,
denoted by C = M\ C. The following lemma upper bounds the contribution of non-competitive
items in the optimal solution.
Lemma 5.3. Let C = {j|qTj >
v¯(ASj )
β
} for constant β > 1. Then, ∑j∈C qTj ≤ ε2(β−1)OPT and∑
j∈C q
T
j ≥ β(2−ε)−22(β−1) OPT.
Proof. From Definition 5.1, it holds with constant probability (w.c.p) that:
OPT ≥
∑
j∈C
qTj +
∑
j∈C
qTj =
∑
j∈U
qTj ≥
(
1− ε
2
)
·OPT
Let SC ⊆ S be the set of the bidders that are allocated the non-competitive items from the greedy
algorithm A when running on set S. Then, in the augmented set T ∪ SC, there exists an allocation
Q7 with liquid valuation,
v¯(Q) ≥
∑
j∈C
qTj +
∑
j∈C
v¯
(
ASj
)
(2)
7Allocation Q is realized by allocating all items in C to bidders in T that also had them in the OPTT allocation and
all items in C to the bidders in SC that had them in the allocation of the greedy A. The claim is completed by
submodularity.
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and therefore we have w.c.p:
OPT ≥ v¯(Q) ≥
∑
j∈C
qTj +
∑
j∈C
v¯
(
ASj
)
≥
∑
j∈C
qTj + β
∑
j∈C
qTj
≥
(
1− ε
2
)
OPT+ (β − 1)
∑
j∈C
qTj
Re-arranging the latter and using the fact that
∑
j∈C
qj +
ε
2(β − 1)OPT ≥
∑
j∈U
qTj ≥
(
1− ε
2
)
OPT
then, for the items in C it holds w.c.p that: ∑j∈C qTj ≥ β(2−ε)−22(β−1) OPT. N
In the next Lemma, we prove a lower bound on the contribution of competitive items to the solution
obtained by the greedy algorithm, with respect to OPT.
Lemma 5.4.
∑
j∈C v¯
(
ASj
)
≥ 2(β−1)−ε·(3β−1)4(β−1) OPT.
Proof. Combining Inequality (2) and Lemma 5.3 we get that
∑
j∈C v¯
(
ASj
)
≤ βε2(β−1)OPT. Algo-
rithm A provides a 2-approximation to the optimal LW of set S [24], so w.c.p we have:
∑
j∈C
v¯
(
ASj
)
+
∑
j∈C
v¯
(
ASj
)
≥ 1
2
OPTS ≥
1− ε2
2
OPT
Combining the last two equations, we get the result. N
Theorem 5.5. The CM Algorithm is universally truthful and achieves, in expectation, a constant
approximation to the optimal LW, i.e.,
E [v¯ (S)] ≥ (1− 2δ) · 2(β − 1)− ε · (3β − 1)
16β(β − 1) OPT
Proof. Since the bidders that control the prices being posted belong to set S and they never get any
item, it is their (weakly) dominant strategy to report their valuations and their budgets truthfully.
Furthermore, the bidders that are buying under the said posted prices belong to set T and they
make BCDQs, which we showed to be truthful. Finally, the bidders are uniformly at random split
to sets S and T.
For each item j ∈ C we have qTj > v¯(ASj )/β. Therefore, there exists an allocation for bidders in T
and items in C that is supported by prices p1, . . . , pm, where pj = v¯(ASj )/β. Thus, a modification
of [14, Lemma 4.2] implies that if we we set p′j = pj/2, for each j ∈ C, and run a fixed price auction
in T with prices p′1, . . . , p
′
m, we get that v¯(S) ≥
∑
j∈C pj/4. Using the latter, along with the prices
of the items, we have that
v¯(S) = 1
4β
∑
j∈C
v¯(ASj ) ≥
2(β − 1)− ε(3β − 1)
16β(β − 1) OPT
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 5.4. Thus, we conclude that E [v¯ (S)] ≥ (1− 2δ) 2(β−1)−ε·(3β−1)16β(β−1) OPT.
N
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6 Bayesian Setting
The Bayesian Setting offers a great middle ground between the unstructured worst-case instances
and the very structured Competitive Markets. In this setting, let ~v = (v1, . . . , vn) be a profile of
bidder valuations and B = (B1, . . . , Bn) a profile of bidder budgets. Assume that the bidders’ val-
uations are drawn independently from distributions V1, . . . ,Vn and the budgets from distributions
B1, . . . ,Bn. For simplicity, let us assume that their liquid valuations are drawn independently from
distributions D1, . . . ,Dn. We will denote by D = D1 × . . . × Dn the product distribution where
liquid valuations profiles, v¯ = (v¯1, . . . , v¯n), are independently drawn from.
We are going to show that the results presented in Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier [20] can be extended
for budget-constrained bidders. Specifically, we are going to show that, if liquid valuations are
fractionally subadditive, then we can create appropriate prices such that, when presented to the
bidders in a posted-price mechanism and bidders are making BCDQs, then we can obtain universally
truthful constant-factor approximation mechanisms for the LW in Bayesian CAs. Our Lemma 6.2
establishes the existence of such appropriately scaled prices. The key component activating our
results is that instead of reasoning about the utility achieved from the bundle purchased by bidder
i (as received by the BCDQ), we instead have to use Lemma 3.3. We also note that using our
techniques one could even achieve the better approximation guarantees presented by Du¨etting et
al. [15]. Their analysis is significantly more complex, however, and we omit it in the interest of
space.
Theorem 6.1. Let distribution D over XOS liquid valuation profiles be given via a sample access
to D. Suppose that for every v¯ ∼ D, we have: i) black-box access to a LW maximization algorithm,
ALG8 ii) an XOS value query oracle (for liquid valuations sampled from D)9. Then, for any ǫ > 0,
we can compute item prices in POLY(m,n, 1/ǫ) time such that, for any bidder arrival order, the
expected liquid welfare of the posted price mechanism is at least 14 Ev¯∼D[v¯(ALG(v¯))]− ǫ, where by
ALG(v¯) we denote the solution produced by algorithm ALG.
Lemma 6.2. Given a distribution D over XOS liquid valuations, let ~p be the price vector s.t.
pj =
1
2 Ev¯∼D[LWj(v¯)]. Let ~p
′ be any price vector such that |p′j − pj|< δ for all j ∈ [m]. Then, for
any arrival order, π, bidders buying bundles by making BCDQs under prices ~p′ results in expected
liquid welfare at least 14 Ev¯∼D[v¯(ALG(v¯))]− mδ2 .
7 Conclusion
In real-life auctions, bidders are always constrained by budgets, which we tend to overlook due
to the technical difficulties that they add. The role of budgets in welfare/revenue optimization
is amplified in CAs, where bidders have richer valuations and hence, studying budgeted CAs is
a step towards bridging the gap between the theory on truthful mechanism design for CAs and
constraints faced in practice. In this work, we showed how the liquid welfare can be approximated
in CAs where bidders are budget-constrained in three settings: worst-case, Competitive Markets
and stochastic. The most meaningful question that arises from our work (apart, of course, from
8ALG can be any algorithm that provides a O(1)-approximation to the optimal LW, since we do not care about
incentives (access to ALG will only happen for ghost samples).
9An XOS value oracle takes as input a set T and returns the corresponding additive representative function for the
set T , i.e., an additive function Ai(·), such that (i) v¯i(S) ≥ Ai(Sˆ) for any Sˆ ⊂ [m] and (ii) v¯i(T ) = Ai(T ).
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the ever existent one of lowering the approximation guarantee in worst-case instances) is related
to the competitive markets. We conjecture that the condition that we provide can be made even
weaker, and leave it to future research.
Finally, our results can also be used to extend a variety of already known results in CAs without
budgets, to CAs with budget-constrained bidders. For example, Lemma 3.3 (with some changes in
the constants of [17]) implies a constant factor approximation for best response dynamics in XOS
CAs with budgeted bidders, that apply after a single round of bid updates.
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Appendix
A Supplementary Material for Section 3.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Clearly, capping valuation with budget does not affect monotonicity. We
provide the proof for each case (i.e., submodular, XOS, subbaditive) separately.
• (submodular) Let v be a monotone submodular set function. Then, by the definition of
submodularity, for sets T ⊆ S and j /∈ S we have:
v (S ∪ {j}) − v (S) ≤ v (T ∪ {j}) − v (T ) (3)
Further, since v is monotone: v(T ) ≤ v(S), which implies that v¯(T ) ≤ v¯(S). We distinguish
the following cases:
1. If B ≤ v (T ∪ {j}) ≤ v (S ∪ {j}). Then, for the liquid valuations we have: v¯ (S ∪ {j})−
v¯ (S) = B − v¯ (S) ≤ B − v¯(T ) ≤ v¯ (T ∪ {j}) − v¯(T ), where the first inequality is due to
monotonicity.
2. If v¯(T ∪ {j}) ≤ v¯(S ∪ {j}) ≤ B. Then, v¯(S ∪ {j}) − v¯(S) = v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S) ≤
v(T ∪ {j}) − v(T ) = v¯(T ∪ {j}) − v¯(T ).
3. If v(T ∪{j}) ≤ B ≤ v(S ∪{j}). This breaks down to the following two cases; on the one
hand, if v(S) ≥ B then, v¯(S ∪ {j})− v¯(S) = 0 ≤ v(T ∪{j})− v(T ) = v¯(T ∪{j})− v¯(T ).
On the other hand, if v(S) < B, then v¯(S∪{j})− v¯(S) = B−v(S) ≤ v(S∪{j})−v(S) ≤
v(T ∪ {j}) − v(T ) = v¯(T ∪ {j}) − v¯(T ). Finally, we remark that due to monotonicity,
these cases are the only possible ones.
• (XOS) Let v be an XOS set function; there exist additive functions α1, . . . , αl s.t. v(S) =
maxi∈[l] αi(S). In order for v¯ to XOS, we need to prove that there exist additive func-
tions α′1, . . . , α
′
l s.t. v¯(S) = maxi∈[l] α
′
i(S). For each function αi we are going to define
m! functions, one for each permutation π of the items. Suppose a specific ordering πt of
the items {1, 2, . . . ,m} and let πt(j) be the position of item j in ordering πt. We de-
fine βπti as: β
πt
i ({j}) = αi({j}), if
∑
k:πt(k)≤πt(j)
αi({k}) ≤ B or βπti ({j}) = max{B −∑
k:πt(k)<πt(j)
αi({k}), 0}, if
∑
k:πt(k)≤πt(j)
αi({k}) > B. First, we are going to prove that
for each S ⊆ U, βπti (S) ≤ min{v(S), B},∀i, πt.
By the definition of βπti , it is clear to see that β
πt
i ({j}) ≤ αi({j}). Therefore, summing upon
all items in S (since we have additive functions), we get that:
βπti (S) ≤ αi(S) ≤ max
k
αk(S) = v(S)
By the definition of βπti , we also have that β
πt
i (S) ≤ B.
Next, we are going to prove that for each S ⊆ U : ∃βπti s.t. βπti (S) = min{v(S), B}. We
distinguish the following cases:
1. v(S) ≤ B. Let πt be a permutation, s.t. all items in S come first and let αi∗ be the
maximizing function for set S, i.e. v(S) = αi∗(S). Then, because
∑
j∈S αi∗({j}) ≤ B,
we have βπti∗ (S) =
∑
j∈S β
πt
i∗ ({j}) =
∑
j∈S αi∗({j}) = v(S).
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2. v(S) > B. Let πt be a permutation, s.t. all items in S come first and let αi∗ be
the maximizing function for set S, i.e. v(S) = αi∗(S). Let j
∗ be the last item in
the permutation πt s.t.
∑
r:πt(r)≤πt(j∗)
αi∗({r}) ≤ B. Then,
∑
r:πt(r)≤πt(j∗)
βπti∗ ({r}) =∑
r:πt(r)≤πt(j∗)
αi∗({r}). For the next items z ∈ S in permutation πt, we have βπti∗ ({z}) =
max{B −∑k:πt(k)<πt(z) αi({k}), 0}. In fact, the first item after j∗ will complete the
missing value, in order to have:
∑
k:πt(k)≤πt(j∗)+1
βπti∗ ({j}) = B , and all subsequent
items, q will have βπti∗ ({q}) = 0. Therefore,
∑
j∈S β
πt
i∗ ({j}) = B.
• (subadditive) Let v be a monotone subadditive set function. We distinguish the following
cases:
1. If v¯(S ∪ T ) = v(S ∪ T ) < B. Then, we know for a fact that v¯(S) = v(S) < B and that
v¯(T ) = v(T ) < B. Then, v¯(S ∪ T ) = v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ) = v¯(S) + v¯(T ), where the
inequality comes from the subadditivity of v.
2. If v¯(S ∪ T ) = B < v(S ∪ T ). We have to further distinguish the following cases:
(a) v¯(S) = B < v(S), v¯(T ) = B < v(T ). Then, v¯(S ∪ T ) = B ≤ 2B = v¯(S) + v¯(T ).
(b) v¯(S) = B < v(S), v¯(T ) = v(T ) < B. Then, v¯(S∪T ) = B ≤ B+v(T ) = v¯(S)+ v¯(T ),
where the inequality comes from the non-negativity of the liquid valuation.
(c) v¯(S) = v(S) < B, v¯(T ) = B < v(T ). Then, v¯(S∪T ) = B ≤ v(S)+B = v¯(S)+ v¯(T ),
where the inequality again comes from the non-negativity of the liquid valuation.
(d) v¯(S) = v(S) < B, v¯(T ) = v(T ) < B. Then, v¯(S∪T ) = B ≤ v(S∪T ) ≤ v(S)+v(T ) =
v¯(S) + v¯(T ), where the last inequality comes from the fact that v is subadditive.
N
B Supplementary Material for Section 4
We include below the core theorems that are used in order to derive the O(
√
logm)-approximation
to the LW, by adapting the techniques used by Dobzinski [14].
Proposition B.1 (Strong Profitability of a set). Let S = argmaxS′⊆U {v(S′)− p(S′)|p(S′) ≤ B}
a strongly profitable set under item prices p1, . . . , pm for valuation v. Then, S is also a strongly
profitable set for the liquid valuation v¯.
Proof. Let T ⊆ S. We want to show that v¯(T ) ≥ p(T ). If v¯(T ) = v(T ), then the property
holds, since S is strongly profitable for valuation v. If v¯(T ) = B, then, due to monotonicity of v¯,
v¯(T ) = v¯(S) ≥ p(S) ≥ p(T ), where the first inequality comes from individual rationality. N
Lemma B.2 (Extension of Lemma 4.2 in [14]). Let α = (α1, . . . , αn) be an allocation that is
supported by prices p1, . . . , pm. A fixed price auction where budget constrained bidders make
BCDQs and the items have prices p′j =
pj
2 generates an allocation Aˆ = (αˆ1, . . . , αˆn) with LW:∑
i∈[n] v¯i(αˆi) ≥
∑
j∈∪iαi
pj
4 .
Proof of Lemma B.2. We will follow closely the proof presented by Dobzinski [14], changing the
analysis only slightly when it is required to reason about the set returned from the BCDQ.
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For every bidder i, let Wi = ∪i′<iαˆi′ denote the set of competitive items that were allocated before
bidder i arrives to the auction. Let OPTi =
∑
j∈(∪i′≥iαi′ )\Wi
pj. Then, OPT1 =
∑
j∈∪iαi
pj and
OPTn+1 = 0. For every bidder i ∈ [n] it holds that Wi+1 = Wi + αˆi and that the allocation
(∅, . . . , ∅, αi \Wi, αi+1 \Wi, . . . , αn \Wi) is still supported by p1, . . . , pm. Thus,
OPTi −OPTi+1 =
∑
j∈(αi\Wi)
pj +
∑
j∈αˆi
pj (4)
Now notice that bidder i could buy set αi−Wi which implies that the liquid valuation that he got
from the set that was ultimately received by the BCDQ was lower bounded by:
v¯i(αi \Wi)−
∑
j∈(αi\Wi)
qj = v¯i(αi \Wi)−
∑
j∈(αi\Wi)
pj
2
≥
∑
j∈(αi\Wi)
pj
2
(5)
Since the bidder had enough budget to buy set αˆi (otherwise, it would not have been received as
the answer of the BCDQ) we have that:
v¯i (αˆi) ≥
∑
j∈αˆi
pj
2
(6)
Summing up Equations(5) and (6) and using Equation (4) we get:
2v¯i (αˆi) ≥
∑
j∈(αi\Wi)
pj
2
+
∑
j∈αˆi
pj
2
=
OPTi −OPTi+1
2
which concludes our proof. N
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Large Market Assumptions for Indivisible Items. Imagine, for example, a large market
with m indivisible items and n bidders, s.t. Bi ≤ OPTm·c for some large constant c > 1. The number
of bidders who receive at least one item is at most m and therefore, OPT ≤ m ·Bmax, which leads
to Bmax ≤ Bmax/c, which is a contradiction. We note here also that one can get similar voidness
results for the case where c < 1; imagine a market with n = m bidders and m items, where the
valuations of the bidders for the items are vii = 1, vij = 0, j 6= i and Bi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ [n]. Then, the
optimal LW is OPT = mBi (achieved when bidder i gets item i). However, for any c < 1 it holds
that Bi ≤ Bi/c, while the market that we have in this example is a very thin market.
In reality, the previous settings discussed in the literature possessed another crucial property, that
made it possible for the large market assumption to enable the results about the constant factor
approximation of the optimal LW. This property was the homogeneity of the goods being auctioned;
every bidder wanted exactly the same item or at least some portion of every item. The homogeneity
of the goods, coupled with the large market assumption, essentially established competitive markets.
18
D Supplementary Material for Section 6.
D.1 Missing Proofs
Proof of Lemma 6.2. We are going to follow the proof presented by Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier
[20]. For each j ∈ Si, we denote by LWj(v¯) := Ai({j}) (i.e., LWj(v¯) corresponds to the contribution
of item j to the liquid welfare, under liquid valuation profile v¯), where Ai(·) is the corresponding
additive representative function for the set Si. From the definition of pj:
p′j = E
v¯∼D
[
LWj(v¯)− p′j
]
+ 2(p′j − pj) (7)
=
∑
i∈[n]
E
v¯∼D
[(
LWj(v¯)− p′j
)
1 {j ∈ Si(v¯)}
]
+ 2(p′j − pj)
Let SOLDi(v¯, π) be the set of items that have been sold prior to the arrival of bidder i. Bidder i’s
BCDQ receives set Si as the answer, from the items in U \SOLDi(v¯, π) that maximizes v(Si)−p(Si)
subject to the fact that p(Si) ≤ Bi. Consider another random liquid valuation profile v¯′−i ∼ D−i,
independent of v¯. Let Si(v¯i, v¯
′
−i) be the allocation returned by ALG on input (v¯i, v¯
′
−i). For the
additive representative function Ai for the set Si(v¯i, v¯
′
−i) it holds that Ai({j}) = LWj(v¯i, v¯′−i) for
each j ∈ Si(v¯i, v¯′−i). Let Si(v¯i, v¯−i, v¯′−i) := Si(v¯i, v¯′−i) \ SOLDi(v¯, π) be the subset of items in
Si(v¯i, v¯−i) that are available for purchase when bidder i arrives. Since bidder i could have bought
set Si(v¯i, v¯−i, v¯
′
−i) but instead did not, using Lemma 3.3 we get that:
2v¯i(Si(v¯))− p(Si(v¯)) ≥ E
v¯
′
−i
[
max
{
LWj(v¯i, v¯
′
−i)− p′j, 0
}]
Summing up for all the bidders and taking the expectation over all v¯ ∼ D we have:
2 E
v¯ ∼D

∑
i∈[n]
v¯i(Si(v¯))

− E
v¯ ∼D

∑
i∈[n]
p(Si(v¯))

 ≥
∑
j∈U
∑
i∈[n]
E
v¯i,v¯−i,v¯
′
−i
[
1
{
j
∈ Si(v¯i, v¯′−i)
} ·max{LWj(v¯i, v¯′−i)− p′j, 0
} · 1 {j
6= SOLDi(v¯, π)}
]
(8)
Following exactly the same steps as in Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier [20] we can rewrite the above
as:
2 E
v¯∼D

∑
i∈[n]
v¯i(Si(v¯))

 − E
v¯∼D

∑
i∈[n]
p(Si(v¯))


≥
∑
j∈U
P
v¯
[j 6= SOLD(v¯, π)] · (pj + (pj − p′j)) (9)
For the expected revenue, due to individual rationality of the bidders it holds that:
E
v¯∼D
[Rev(v¯, π)] =
∑
j∈U
P
v¯
[j ∈ SOLD(v¯, π)] · (pj − (pj − p′j)) (10)
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Adding Equations (10) and (9) we get:
2 E
v¯∼D

∑
i∈[n]
v¯i(Si(v¯))

 − E
v¯∼D

∑
i∈[n]
p(Si(v¯))

+ E
v¯∼D
[Rev(v¯, π)]
≥
∑
j∈U
pj +
∑
j∈U
(pj − p′j)
(
1− 2P
v¯
[j ∈ SOLD(v¯, π)]
)
≥ 1
2
E
v¯∼D

∑
i∈[n]
v¯i(Si)

−
∑
j∈U
∣∣pj − p′j
∣∣
≥ 1
2
E
v¯∼D

∑
i∈[n]
v¯i(Si)

−mδ
N
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Observe that we only needed to prove a variant of Lemma 3.4 by Feldman,
Gravin, and Lucier [20], which we did in Lemma 6.2. This is due to the fact that the sampling
arguments presented for finding the appropriate prices hold without any modification in our case
too, since the liquid valuation remains XOS for XOS valuation functions. Further, no reasoning
about incentives is required in this proof, since we are basing our arguments on “ghost” samples
that we draw from the known product distribution D. N
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